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Lawmakers in the US have added an extra layer of drama to Nicaragua’s upcoming presidential and
parliamentary elections, threatening economic sanctions if President Daniel Ortega, a virtual shooin for reelection, fails to improve his tarnished democratic credentials.
On Sept. 21, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to approve legislation known as
the Nicaragua Investment Conditionality Act (NICA) of 2016. The bill, sponsored by Rep. Ileana RosLehtinen, a Republican from Miami, calls on the US to oppose non-humanitarian loans to Nicaragua
unless the Nicaraguan government, led by Ortega since 2007, takes “effective steps to hold free, fair,
and transparent elections, and for other purposes.” The “other purposes” include strengthening the
rule of law and ensuring that Nicaragua’s judiciary and electoral council—which have proven, in
recent years, to be openly partial to Ortega—operate independently.
The NICA legislation threatens to cut Nicaragua off from hundreds of millions of dollars in credits
from international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and InterAmerican Development Bank. In order to move forward, however, the bill will also need to be
approved by the US Senate and the White House, both of which are dealing with serious time
constraints—and plenty of political uncertainty—as the US prepares to hold its own presidential and
congressional elections. The Nicaragua elections take place Nov. 6. US voters head to the polls two
days later.
The threatened sanctions, in other words, may end up being just that: a threat. But they’re also a
clear sign that US authorities, on both sides of the political aisle, are paying closer attention to—
and growing increasingly concerned about—Ortega’s long list of less-than-democratic power plays,
including his decision, in early August, to name Rosario Murillo, his wife and Nicaragua’s first lady,
as his vice presidential running mate (NotiCen, Aug. 25, 2016). The move is likely to give Murillo a
healthy dose of formal power to go along with the unofficial clout she wields as the government’s
communications chief and de facto Cabinet head.
Speaking Sept. 15 to members of the US House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Juan
S. Gonzalez, a deputy assistant secretary of state, openly accused Ortega of “working to transform
the country into a de facto one-party system.” He also said that Ortega’s party, the Frente Sandinista
de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), “has applied the tools of government, the judiciary, political
manipulation, and intimidation to eliminate the system of checks and balances necessary for a
vibrant and functioning democracy.”
Six weeks earlier, John Kirby, the US State Department spokesperson, also spoke out against
developments in Nicaragua. “We strongly urge the Nicaraguan government to create an
environment for free and fair elections that will allow the Nicaraguan people to determine the
future of their country,” he said Aug. 1. And on July 29, the State Department took the rare step of
issuing a “Travel Alert” for Nicaragua, warning US citizens about “increased government scrutiny of
foreigners’ activities, new requirements for volunteer groups, and the potential for demonstrations
during the upcoming election season in Nicaragua.”
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Toward a one-party state
US authorities aren’t alone in expressing concern about Ortega’s strong-arm leadership style and
his handling, in particular, of the upcoming elections. In Nicaragua, opposition leaders have been
sounding alarms for months as the president and his allies in the judiciary and Consejo Supremo
Electoral (CSE), the country’s top electoral authority, wrested from them what little power and
representation remained.
Ortega’s political opponents, led by the center-right Partido Liberal Independiente (Liberal
Independent Party, PLI), first sensed trouble when the CSE waited until May to officially announce
the November elections. Elections are normally announced a year in advance, giving participating
candidates and parties plenty of time to prepare (NotiCen, June 16, 2016). More worrisome still
was Ortega’s announcement, in early June, that the elections would be closed to outside monitors.
“We’re done with having observers here. Let them go observe in their own countries,” he said
during a June 4 convention in Managua, the Nicaraguan capital, where some 2,000 FSLN delegates
nominated him as the party’s presidential candidate for the seventh time in a row.
In the meantime, the PLI and its allies in the so-called Coalición Nacional por la Democracia
(National Coalition for Democracy, CND) chose their own candidates for president and vice
president: Luis Callejas, a lawmaker, doctor, and former contra fighter; and Violeta Granera, a
sociologist and civil society activist. But on June 8, Nicaragua’s highest court, the Corte Suprema de
Justicia (CSJ), nullified the ticket by stripping the CND’s political architect, Eduardo Montealegre, of
his role as leader and legal representative of the PLI (NotiCen, July 7, 2016). The high court instead
awarded leadership of the party to attorney Pedro Reyes, head of a competing PLI faction and an
apparent Ortega ally.
Montealegre’s removal also had repercussions for the PLI’s elected representatives in the Asamblea
Nacional (AN), Nicaragua’s unicameral legislature. Rather than fall in line behind Reyes, many
PLI lawmakers, including Montealegre and Callejas, declared themselves politically independent.
The CSE responded in late July by ousting them from the AN (NotiCen, Aug. 25, 2016). In total, 16
elected opposition members and 12 alternates lost their legislative seats. Even before that, the FSLN
had a two-thirds “super majority” and could thus steamroll any and all legislation Ortega sent its
way. The PLI had at least, however, been able to raise objections. Now even that small amount of
influence has been quashed.

Solid grip on power
The US sanctions threat stands little chance of keeping Ortega from winning a third consecutive
five-year term and fourth overall, not including his time as leader of Nicaragua’s post-revolutionary
junta government (1979-1985). Nor, for that matter, do last-minute efforts by Ortega’s political
opponents to organize protests and persuade voters to boycott the election. Demonstrations held
Oct. 8 in Matiguás, Matagalpa, and Oct. 9 in Somoto, Madriz, attracted a bit of media attention but
only small crowds.
Nearly 66% of respondents to a late August poll by M&R Consultores said they would vote for
Ortega versus just 4.4% for his closest contender, Maximino Rodríguez of the conservative Partido
Liberal Constitucionalista (Liberal Constitutionalist Party, PLC). The PLI, now being represented by
José del Carmen Alvarado, could fare worse. Del Carmen Alvarado was added to the ballot just last
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month, after Pedro Reyes, chosen to replace Callejas, dropped out. Reyes polled at just 2.2% in the
M&R survey.
Critics dismiss Rodriguez and Del Carmen Alvarado as “straw-man candidates,” people who lend
the election an air of legitimacy without posing any real challenge to Ortega’s chances. “There aren’t
any credible opposition candidates, because the ones there had been were removed on orders from
the Corte Suprema de Justicia,” Nicaraguan writer Sergio Ramírez, Ortega’s vice president in the
late 1980s, wrote in an essay published Aug. 8 by the Argentine daily La Nación.
The election, in other words, is expected to be a cakewalk for Ortega and Murillo. Little wonder,
then, that the government dismissed the Sept. 21 US House of Representatives vote as “a
violation of international law” and “part of a pattern of historic interventionist policies.” Looking
forward, however, the ruling couple may want to take better care of its relationship with the US,
which isn’t likely to wage war against the FSLN, as it did in the 1980s by training and funding
counterrevolutionaries, but does wield significant economic clout. In addition to having veto power
over some outside loans, the US is also a major source of outside investment and Nicaragua’s
biggest trading partner, realities Ortega cannot afford to ignore, given how much his popularity
depends on Nicaragua’s relative economic success and on his government’s poverty assistance
programs.
“We’re going to vote for the FSLN. We’re all with Daniel,” Lisbeth Paz, 20, of Villa Guadalupe,
an impoverished community northeast of Managua that has benefited greatly from government
largess, told the AFP news agency last month. “Before, we didn’t have anything to eat… Now, we
have this house. And the whole family works.”

-- End --
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